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Comment
A Wrong Turn Crushes Protective Air Regulations:
American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA
Deborah Behles*
Not only did the panel depart from a half century of Supreme Court
separation-of-powers jurisprudence, but in doing so, it stripped the
Environmental Protection Agency of much of its ability to implement
the Clean Air Act, this nation's primary means of protecting the
safety of the air breathed by hundreds of millious of people.
-American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA (Judge Tatel, dissenting)l

In 1997, after extensive review, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) issued stringent standards to regulate
particulate matter (PM) in the air. 2 The EPA expected that
these PM standards, combined with the new 1997 ozone
standard, would prevent "15,000 premature deaths, 350,000
cases of aggravated asthma, and one million cases of
significantly decreased lung function in children each year."3
The cost of implementing the stringent PM standards would

* J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 1998,
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. This paper is dedicated to the
memory of Julie DePhillips and her dedication to the environment. The
author would like to thank the members of the Minnesota Law Review,
Andrew Gagen, Erik Olson, and Patricio Silva for their suggestions on earlier
drafts of this Comment.
1. Am. Trucking Ass'us v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (Tatel, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v.
EPA, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. May 30, 2000) (No. 99-1426); Browner v. Am.
Trucking Ass'us, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (U.S. May 22,2000) (No. 99-1257).
2. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter:
Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (July 18, 1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50)
[hereinafter 1997 Final Rule].
3. EPA, EPA's Updated Clean Air Standards, at http://www.epa.gov/ttnl
oarpg/naaqsfinlnaaqsfac.html Qast visited Aug. 28, 2000); see also Health
Effects Institute, Reanalysis of the Harvard Six Cities Study and the American
Cancer Society Study of Particulate Air Pollution and Mortality, http://www.
healtheffects.org/news.htm (July 2000). This report reaffirmed the connection
between an increased risk of mortality and living in cities with higher longterm levels of particulate air pollution. Id.
319
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fall predominantly on industry4 because the pollutant is
generally associated with power generation, industrial boilers,
and automotive emissions. 5 Consequently, though public
health and environmental groups widely supported the new
standards, industrial groups strongly opposed their
implementation. 6 These industrial interests, which included
the American Trucking Associations,7 challenged the PM
standard in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
4. See infra note 6. Several industries, evidenced by the names of the
American Trucking respondents, are affected by the rules. See Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari for the Environmental Protection Agency at 2, Am. Trucking
Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1257), http://www.usdoj.
gov/osglbriefsl1999/2pet/7pet/99-1257.pet.aa.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2000)
[hereinafter Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for the EPAl; Thomas M. Strah,
Clinton Backs Clean Air Standards, TRANSPORT TOPICS: TRUCKING'S
ELECTRONIC NEWSPAPER, at http://www.ttnews.comlmemberslprintEditionl
weekly.archivel06.30.97.tw3.html (June 30, 1997) ("Utilities, automakers, oil
companies, miners and manufacturers have already joined forces to wage a
lobbying battle that participants on both sides say is unusually big and
intense for a regulatory question.").
5. See EPA, 1997 National Air Quality: Status and Trends, Particulate
Matter, http://www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd97lhrochurelpm10.html (Dec. 1998).
6. Sandra Roberts, A Furor Erupts over Ozone Standards, CHEMICAL
ENGINEERING, Aug. 1997, at 48. After the final rule was introduced, industry
lobbied Congress in an effort to prevent enforcement of the standards. See
generally National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Salvaging Air Quality
Standards, at http://www.nrdc.org/air/ pollutionlnaqstan.asp (last visited Aug.
28, 2000) (noting the strong effort by industry to prevent implementation of
the standards) [hereinafter Salvaging Air Quality Standardsl. Industrial
interests coordinated legislative, regulatory, and legal challenges to the
revised PM standard. See, e.g., Daniel P. Bearth, ATA Tells EPA: Back Of{,
TRANSPORT
TOPICS:
TRUCKING'S
ELECTRONIC
NEWSPAPER,
at
http://www.ttnews.comlmemberslprintEditionl
weekly.archivel03.17.97.tw3.html (March 17, 1997). The American Trucking
Associations and a number of other industrial interests informed the EPA
early on that they thought the new standards were drastic and unscientific.
See id.
7. There are several respondents. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
for the EPA, supra note 4. The respondents include the American Farm
Bureau Federation, American Forest and Paper Association, American Iron
and Steel Institute, American Petroleum Association, Chemical
Manufacturers Association, National Association of Manufacturers, National
Association of Home Builders, National Automobile Dealers Association,
National Coalition of Petroleum Retailers, National Mining Association,
National Small Business United, and the United Mine Workers of America.
Id. The respondents also represent other interests, including states such as
Ohio. Persons appearing as amicus curiae include Representative Tom Bliley
and Senator Orrin G. Hatch. Id. at 4. The EPA's position is supported by the
American Lung Association, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the
states of New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont.
Id. at 2.
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of Columbia. 8 As a result of this litigation, the EPA's ability9 to
protect Americans from harmful PM was seriously
diminished. 10 The court concluded that the EPA had issued the
new PM standardsll without following an "intelligible
principle," and challenged the agency to find a "determinate"
standard as a basis for its decision. 12 The court found that the
EPA's construction of the Clean Air Act (CAA) resulted in an
unconstitutional delegation oflegislative power.l 3 Notably, the
per curiam opinion, authored by Circuit Judges Ginsburg and
Williams,14 revived the nondelegation doctrine, widely viewed
as dead for decades, by relying on selected details of the
rulemaking process to support the decision.15 After this
8. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. granted sub
nom. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. May 30, 2000) (No.
99-1426); Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (U.S. May 22,
2000) (No. 99-1257).
9. Fortunately, the Clean Air Act (CAA) includes several redundancies
ensuring air pollution is addressed. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1994) (requiring
the reduction of PM because sulfate emissions from coal-fired electric
generating units comprise a large portion of fine PM emissions); see also Clean
Air Act, §§ 169A, 169B, 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (1994). Under this program, the EPA
must protect the visibility in Class I areas that include wilderness and
national park areas. Consequently, the EPA enacted a final national haze
rule requiring various sources to reduce PM emissions. 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714
(July 1, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51).
10. The Department of Justice (DOJ), however, is still enforcing the CAA.
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, U.S. Sues Electric Utilities in Unprecedented
Action to Enforce the Clean Air Act (Nov. 3, 1999), 1999 WL 1005143, at *1.
On November 3, 1999, the DOJ filed seven lawsuits against utility companies
alleging CAA violations. ld. These actions seek to mandate that such
facilities install air pollution-control technology. ld. Sadly, however, in late
October 1999, John Chafee, the Senate Environmental and Public Works
Committee chairman died. Neil Franz, Chafee's Death Could Derail Key
Legislation, CHEMICAL WEEK, Nov. 3, 1999, at 16, 1999 WL 9312431. Senator
Chafee was an environmental advocate and a key vote for environmental
groups during his twenty-four years in the Senate. ld. His death could hurt
the possibility of enforcing the new PM regulation. ld.
11. The court also found that the promulgation of the O7;one standards
violated the nondelegation doctrine. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. This
Comment only addresses the court's treatment of the PM regulation, however.
12. ld.
13. ld. at 1034.
14. Judge Tatel, who dissented from Part I, authored Part IV.A-C of the
opinion.
15. The panel's revival of the nondelegation doctrine and selective use of
facts may be based on a law review article suggesting judicial reinvigoration of
the nondelegation doctrine. See generally Kenneth Culp Davis, A New
Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 713 (1969).
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controversial decision, the entire D.C. Circuit denied the EPA's
petition for rehearing en banc. 16 The EPA appealed the
decision to the United States Supreme COurt,17 to reverse the
decision. 1s The Court will hear the case this Fall. 19
American Trucking evaluated the EPA's procedure for
promulgating revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) under the CAA.20 These standards set
national goals for concentrations of outdoor air pollutants,
which are emitted from a variety of sources and threaten public
health. 21 The NAAQS must be reviewed every five years to
ensuril that the standards reflect current scientific

16. American Trucking, 195 F.3d at 14. Nine of the eleven D.C. Circuit
judges reviewed the petition and issued a response. Id. at 13. To grant
rehearing, at least six judges must agree to rehear the case. Id. Only five
judges agreed to rehear the case and the court denied the petition. Id.
17. See, e.g., Carol Cole, Supreme Court Next Stop on EPA's NAAQS
Appeal Track, OCTANE WEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, LEXIS, News, By Individual
Publication, Phillips Business Information, Inc. Newsletters. Cole's article
accurately predicted that the EPA would appeal the D.C. Circuit's decision.
Id.
18. See Carol Browner, Prepared Oral Statement on Court Decision,
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/gen/cmbtest.html (May 20, 1999) [hereinafter
Browner Prepared Statement on Decision]. EPA Administrator Carol Browner
stated: "We are pursuing all options available to us to overturn this decision.
And in the interim we will take whatever steps, consistent with the court's
decision, so that we can secure these protections for all Americans." Id. She
later commented that the EPA is "encouraged that five of the nine judges who
actually reviewed the case agreed with EPA's argument that the Clean Air Act
is constitutional and recognized the importance of the protections provided by
our stricter air pollution standards ...." This opinion puts [the] EPA in a very
strong position for future legal action." Press Release, EPA, Browner
Statement on Appeals Court Decision (Oct. 29, 1999), http://www.epa.gov/
region2/epd/99172.htm.
19. The petitions for certiorari were granted by the Supreme Court on
May 22 and May 30, 2000. A petition was granted for review of the delegation
decision. Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (U.S. May 22,
2000) (No. 99-1257). In addition, the Supreme Court granted an industrysponsored petition to review whether the NAAQS should be based partly on
cost. Am Trucking Ass'ns v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. May 30, 2000)
(No. 99-1426). Oral argument is scheduled for November 7,2000. Supreme
Court of the United States: October Term 2000, http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/calendar/argument_oct30.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2000).
20. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033.
21. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(d)(l), 7408(a)(2) (1994); see also EPA,
Regulating Smog and Particle Air Pollution: Air Quality, http://www.epa.gov/
airprogm/ oar/oaqps/regusmoglairqual.html (Aug. 8, 1997).
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knowledgeP PM, commonly known as soot, is one of the
pollutants regulated under the NAAQS.23
Focusing on the NAAQS promulgation process, the D.C.
Circuit initially found that the EPA followed the statutory
procedure, mandated by Congress in the CAA, to revise the
NAAQS.24
Nevertheless, the court contested the EPA's
procedure, finding that the EPA failed to identify a determinate
standard for issuing and revising the NAAQS. In other words,
the D.C. Circuit found that the procedure lacked an "intelligible
principle.''25 Consequently, this decision could halt a significant
portion of the EPA's efforts to protect the public under the
CAA.26 In addition, if the decision is upheld, the majority of
rulemaking efforts by administrative agencies could be
susceptible to invalidation because their congressional
delegations of authority are less specific than those articulated
in the CAAP Moreover, important economic rules issued by
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(d)(1), 7408(a)(2).
23. Id. §§ 7409(d)(1), 7408(a)(2).
24. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033-38.
25. Id. at 1038. See generally Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971) (stating that an
"intelligible principle" needs to be furnished so a court can police the
implementation of the statute).
26. See City ofS. Pasadena v. Slater, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1106,1139 n.23 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) ("The Court sets forth its reasoning on this issue [coarse PM
regulations] in this section of the opinion in the event that American Trucking
is modified on further review."); Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, Inc. v.
Dalton, 48 F. Supp. 2d 582, 601 n.20 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding that the
plaintiffs argument about the Navy's failure to comply with the air quality
standards was without merit considering the uncertainty introduced by the
American Trucking opinion), affd, 217 F.3d 838 (4th Cir. 2000).
Uncertainty was already present in the EPA's enforcement efforts because
of legislation delaying implementation of the PM standard. President Clinton
directed the EPA to postpone implementing the PMu standard until after the
next five-year NAAQS review period because of the questionable science upon
which the EPA based its decision. See Implementation of Revised Air Quality
Standards for Ozone and Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,421 (July 19,
1997). This statement was alluded to in Title VI of the Transportation Equity
Act for the 21st Century. See Pub. L. No. 105-178, §§ 6101-02, 112 Stat. 46365 (1998).
27. See Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Judicial Review of EPA Air
Quality Standards, N.Y. L.J., July 12, 1999, at 3 (predicting that the decision
could paralyze administrative rulemaking). Specifically, American Trucking
could transform legislative authority for agency decision-making and judicial
oversight of agency rulemaking. See id.; see also Randolph J. May, A
Constitutional Time Bomb: D.C. Court of Appeals Chides Delegating of
Legislative Authority to EPA, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., June 25, 1999, WL,
Fulton Daily Database ("[T]he court did more than throw a monkey wrench
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agencies such as the Federal Communication Commission, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Federal Power
Commission,28 which are supported by business and industry,
could be invalidated under the decision's rationale. Finally,
upholding the decision may require the EPA to consider cost
and technological feasibility when determining ambient air
quality standards, although the standards are currently based
solely on health considerations.29
This Comment analyzes whether American Trucking
correctly concluded that the NAAQS informal rulemaking
procedure, specifically the 1997 PM revision process, lacked an
"intelligible principle" in violation of the nondelegation
doctrine. Part I outlines the judicially imposed restraints on
agency rulemaking and describes the history of the NAAQS
revisions, particularly the revised PM standard. Part II
describes American Trucking and discusses the reasoning
behind the court's challenge to find an "intelligible principle"
for the NAAQS revisions. Part III argues that American
Trucking erred because the EPA did follow an "intelligible
principle" when it promulgated the 1997 revised PM standards.
This Comment concludes that American Trucking should be
reversed and that the Supreme Court should reinstate the
EPA's authority to protect the public from harmful air
pollutants under the CAA.
I. THE ROADS TO AMERICAN TRUCKING

American Trucking represents the intersection of four
different roads: (1) a court's evaluation of agency action where,
(2) as a result of a congressional delegation, (3) the agency acts
to regulate an air pollutant, and (4) later revises these
regulations.
into EPA's enforcement of the Clean Air Act. It lobbed a constitutional time
bomb that potentially could have government-wide impact.").
28. See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1057 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (listing
agency delegations less specific than Section 109 of the CAA). As discussed
later, these statutes are less specific than Section 109 of the CAA. See infra
Part IILB.4.
29. See David M. Friedland & David M. Williamson, D.C. Circuit Strikes
Down Ozone and Particulate Matter Rules, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS.,
July 1999, at 8, available at WL 07/99 METCC8 (stating that industry may
now be able to overturn prior D.C. Circuit decisions prohibiting cost and
technological feasibility considerations when setting air quality standards).
See generally Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(holding that the EPA may not consider cost when revising the NAAQS).
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A. A COURT'S FUNCTION: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY
RULEMAKING

The judicial branch has the duty to ensure that an agency's
actions are within constitutional and statutory limits. Courts
review an agency's rulemaking decision by evaluating both the
congressional delegation and the agency's decision. Both
reviews limit an agency's power to promulgate rules.
Initially, before an agency can promulgate rules, Congress
must delegate rulemaking authority to the agency.3 0 Any
statutory delegation must specifically limit agency discretion to
avoid violating the "nondelegation doctrine."31 The functions of
the nondelegation doctrine are threefold: (1) to ensure
important policy choices are made by Congress, the elected
branch of government; (2) to guarantee that Congress guides
agency discretion with an "intelligible principle"; and (3) to
guarantee meaningful judicial review. 32
To determine whether a statutory delegation violates the
nondelegation doctrine, a court will look for an "intelligible
principle."33 Congress establishes an "intelligible principle"
when it enacts a statute that limits an agency's rulemaking
authority.34 To find an "intelligible principle" courts consider:
(1) the statutory language applicable to the rulemaking
function; (2) other sections of the statute; (3) the purpose of the
statute; and (4) the statute's legislative history.35
The Supreme Court has not held that a statute violated the
nondelegation doctrine since the 1930s.36 In fact, the only real
use of the doctrine occurred when a hostile Supreme Court
30. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. A delegation of legislative authority must
originate in Congress to satisfy Article I of the Constitution which provides in
part that "[a]lllegislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States." Id.
31. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
529-30 (1935).
32. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038
(citing Chief Justice Rehnquist's earlier articulation of the function of the
nondelegation doctrine).
33. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337
F. Supp. 737, 746 CD.D.C. 1971).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 748.
36. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter
Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 551 (declaring part of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA) unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (same).
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disagreed with President Roosevelt's economic policy and used
the nondelegation doctrine to strike down parts of New Deal
legislation. 37 Absent such a politically charged environment,
the Court has continually refused to apply the doctrine
recognizing the compelling necessity for Congress to delegate
rulemaking responsibilities to effectively administer the federal
government. 38
After finding a permissible delegation to an agency, a court
will evaluate the substance of the administrative decision. 39
Traditionally, courts have recognized the pragmatic importance
of deferring to agency decision-making in areas of specialized
expertise,40 because when such expertise is required, agencies
possess the necessary knowledge for effective development and
timely promulgation of the rules.41 The judicial standard of
review applied to EPA decisions depends on whether the
challenged decision is procedural, legal, or factual. 42 For legal
37. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY 12-34 (1966) (discussing the hostility of the early New Deal Court
to Roosevelt's economic programs).
38. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist has suggested reinvigoration of the
nondelegation doctrine, the Court has not accepted his suggestion. See Indus.
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686-88 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Occupational Safety and
Health Act represented an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power
because Congress did not specify whether the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration needed to employ a cost-benefit analysis in its rulemaking
procedure).
39. See infra note 42 and accompanying text (describing the scope of
judicial review for administrative agency actions).
40. In the past, the judiciary has deferred considerably to EPA decisionmaking. See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975) (upholding the EPA's
decision to approve a state plan because the decision was reasonable); Lead
Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (deferring to the
EPA's decision concerning the lead NAAQS); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,
12 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (allowing the EPA to regulate lead additives
which demonstrate a "significant risk of harm," although the data was
inconclusive). Therefore, unless an EPA decision is plainly unreasonable, a
court should defer to the Agency's decision. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 647 F.2d at
1147.
41. See May, supra note 27. According to May, administrative agencies
play an essential role in today's world because legislatures cannot effectively
enact legislation to address all of their legislative aspirations.
Id.
Additionally, May believes that Congress delegates rulemaking authority to
administrative agencies because it does not want to be accountable for making
tough decisions in fields such as environmental law . Id.
42. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). This section provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning
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issues, courts defer to an administrative agency's
interpretation of the law if the interpretation is reasonable. 43
For procedural questions, courts refer to the procedures
articulated in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).44
Except in compelling circumstances, Courts may not require
anything beyond the standard of review provided for in the
APA.45
For factual issues arising in informal rulemaking and nonadjudicatory proceedings, courts apply an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review. 46 Under this review, a court
must examine the facts with a "searching and careful" inquiry47
to educate itself on the issues faced by the administrative
or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court
shall-(l) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E)
unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the
extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by~ the reviewing
court. In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account
.
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.

Id.
43. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984); Tex. Mun.
Power Agencyv. EPA, 89 F.3d 858,869 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (applying
the Chevron analysis to the CAA). The first inquiry under Chevron is whether
Congress has directly spoken on the contested legal issue. Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842-43. If Congress has spoken directly on the issue, a court should adopt
its explicit intent and the judicial inquiry ends. Id. If Congress is silent on
the issue, a court should defer to the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable
and consistent with the statute. Id. at 843.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
45. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,
545-49 (1978) (holding that courts should not impose additional requirements
beyond those specified in the APA).
46. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-18
(1971) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to an agency
decision), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). The Overton
Park Court stated that "the court must consider whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgment. . .. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one." Id. at
416; cf. Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co. v. EPA, 95 F.3d 101, 103 (1st Cir. 1996)
(noting that review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow).
47. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
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agency.48
To determine if a decision is "arbitrary and
capricious," a court must then ascertain whether the agency
looked at all of the applicable factors while making the
decision. 49 A court will interfere only if there is a clear,
unequivocal error in judgment.50 One example of an informal
rulemaking procedure subject to this standard of review is the
promulgation of the CANs NAAQS.
B. THE DELEGATION: THE CAA AND THE NAAQS

Congress enacted the CAA to "protect and enhance the
quality of the nation's air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its
population."51 The cornerstone goal of the CAA is to create and
maintain NAAQS. To establish the NAAQS, the EPA must
compile a list of criteria pollutants. 52 Specifically, criteria
pollutants are pollutants that "may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare" and are produced by
"numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources. "53 After
listing a criteria pollutant, the EPA has twelve months to
publish an air quality criteria document, which reflects the
''latest scientific knowledge" of the pollutant's effects on the
general public. 54

48. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(stating that the only purpose of the inquiry is the court's education); see also
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (stating that a
court "must understand enough about the problem confronting the agency to
comprehend the meaning of the evidence relied upon and the evidence
discarded; the questions addressed by the agency and those bypassed; the
choices open to the agency and those made").
49. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
50. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (describing the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review as narrow).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994).
52. Id. § 7408(a)(1).
53. Id. §§ 7408(a)(1)(A), 7408(a)(1)(B). Additionally, the statute requires
the Administrator to name each pollutant "for which air quality criteria had
not been issued before December 31, 1970 but for which he plans to issue air
quality criteria under this section." Id. § 7408(a)(1)(C); see, e.g., NRDC v.
Train, 411 F. Supp. 864, 867-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (mem.) (discussing the
promulgation of air quality criteria for lead), affd, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) ("The Administrator shall issue air quality
criteria. .. [which] shall accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge
useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public
health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant
in the ambient air, in varying quantities.").
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Next, the Administrator must establish "primary" and
"secondary" NAAQS for the criteria pollutants. 55 Primary
NAAQS are issued at a level "requisite to protect the public
health" with an "adequate margin of safety. "56 Secondary
NAAQS protect the public from any effects "associated with the
presence of such an air pollutant in the ambient air."57 In other
words, primary standards protect people and secondary
standards protect the environment (agriculture, livestock,
buildings, etc). The EPA must issue and submit for public
comment the proposed primary and secondary NAAQS.58
Current criteria pollutants include PM, sulfur dioxide, carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxide, ozone, and lead.59
When the CAA was enacted, Congress knew that the
NAAQS would result in increased cost to industrial facilities. 6o
Nevertheless, Congress decided public health was more
important than cost or technological considerations.61
Therefore, under the CAA, the EPA must base its decision of
where to set a standard solely on a pollutant's effect on human
health; the EPA may not consider the cost or feasibility of
complying with the standard. 62
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(A).
56. [d. § 7409(b). The statute specifies that the standards should be set
(a) in the Administrator's judgment, (b) based on health-related criteria, and
(c) with an adequate margin of safety. [d. Additionally, section 7408(a)(1)
provides:
For the purpose of establishing national primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards, the Administrator shall . . . publish,
and shall from time to time thereafter revise, a list which includes
each air pollutant---(A) emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare; (B) the presence of which in the
ambient air results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary
sources ....
[d.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (1994).
58. [d. § 7409(a)(2).
59. [d. § 7407. When the CAA was enacted in 1970, air quality criteria
already existed for sulfur oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons,
and photochemical oxidants. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4 to 50.12 (2000).
Nitrogen dioxide was added in 1971, and lead was added in 1976. See id.
60. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1149 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (reasoning that "the absence of any provision requiring consideration of
these factors was no accident; it was the result of a deliberate decision by
Congress to subordinate such concerns to the achievement of health goals").
61. See id.
.
62. [d.; see also NRDC v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per
curiam), vacated in part by NRDC v. EPA, 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir 1991) (per
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After setting an initial standard, the EPA must "complete
a thorough review" of the NAAQS every five years and make
appropriate revisions. 63 An independent scientific review
committee, the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
(CASAC), assists this review process.64 This committee reviews
the scientific data on the pollutant's effects on health and
recommends revisions in the criteria and the NAAQS.65 The
EPA has been reluctant to revise the NAAQS because of
scientific uncertainty66 and the enormous administrative
burden associated with the revision process. This five-year
review, however, is statutorily mandated and, therefore, not
discretionary.67 Consequently, the PM standard is subject to
continuing revision. 68

curiam); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Notably, costs are considered later when the EPA implements the standards.
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(I) (1994); see also Envt!. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 870
F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir. 1989) (concluding that "the Administrator must make
some decision regarding the revision of the NAAQS" subject to judicial review
when the EPA publishes a new criteria document).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A) (1994) ("The Administrator shall appoint an
independent scientific review committee composed of seven members including
at least one member of the National Academy of Sciences, one physician, and
one person representing State air pollution control agencies.").
65. Id. § 7409(d)(2)(B-C).
66. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Carbon MonoxideFinal Decision, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,906 (Aug. 1, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50)
(discussing the EPA's decision not to revise the carbon monoxide standards
because of scientific uncertainty).
67. Thomas, 870 F.2d at 899-900 (holding that the EPA must take some
formal action every five years, either by revising or declining to revise the
standards).
68. See, e.g., National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality
Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (Apr. 28, 1971) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 410)
(describing the EPA's first PM regulation).

2000]

331
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THE PROCESS OF NAAQS REVIEWi9
Before Review: Congress mandates that the
standards must be:
a) requisite to protect public health;
b) with an adequate margin of safety; and
c) based solely on health considerations.

Step 1: Preparation of the
Agency's "criteria
document"-an assessment
of scientific data relating to
health and the
environmental effect of the
pollutant.

~

.-

Step 2: Preparation of the
"staff paper" based on the
"criteria document" and the
views of the EPA staff.

lJ'

Step 3: Drafts of
"criteria document"
and "stafi"paper"
receive extensive
review by:
a) the scientific
community;
b) industry;
c) public interest
groups;
d) the public; and
e) theCASAC.

Step 6: The EPA Administrator makes a Final
Decision on a New Revised Standard incorporating
the "criteria document" (step 1), the "stafi"paper" (step
2), extensive review of both documents (step 3),
CASAC recommendations (step 4), and extensive
public comment (step 5).

~

Step 4: The EPA
Administrator
decides
whether to revise
theCASAC
recommendation
and scientific
information.

.-

.I

StepS:
Extensive public
review
and comment
period.

c.

THE POLLUTANT: THE NAAQS PM REGULATION
PM is another name for very small airborne particles, such
as dust and sand, that are invisible to the naked eye. These
particles consist of a complex mixture of organic and inorganic
matter in the form of discrete solids and liquid droplets. 7o Both

69. 42 U.S.C § 7409 (1994); see also EPA, Fact Sheet: EPA's National
Ambient Air Quality Standards: The Standard Review/Reevaluation Process,
http://www.epa.gov/ttnioarpg/naaqsfinlnaaqs.html(July 17,1997).
70. GERARD KIELY, ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING 345 (1997); C. DAVID
COOPER & F.C. ALLEY, Am POLLUTION CONTROL: A DESIGN APPROACH 101
(2d ed. 1994). There are several different terms for PM: suspended particulate
matter, total suspended particulates, black smoke, inhalable thoracic
particles, and PMw KIELY, supra, at 345. In addition, foreign countries use
different sizes to classify particles as PM. Id. at 346.
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natural and anthropogenic (man-made) sources emit PM.7!
Natural sources include volcanoes, forest fires, windstorms,
pollen, and ocean spray.72 Anthropogenic sources are industry
processes, mmmg, construction, motor vehicle exhaust,
combustion, and refuse incineration.73 Common components of
PM are road, tire; and brake dust, volcanic ash, pollen, sea salt,
wood smoke, diesel soot, ammonium nitrate, and ammonium
sulfate. 74
When inhaled in high concentrations, PM can damage lung
tissue and contribute to cancer and respiratory disease. In
1982, the EPA issued a three-volume air quality criteria
document75 that examined, among other things, studies of the
health effects of acute exposure to ambient PM concentrations
in London, England during the 1950s and 1960s.76 The
document suggested that there was no safe level of PM,
essentially making it a "non-threshold" pollutant.77 Subsequent
studies78 demonstrate that these particles, although generally
non-toxic, irritate the respiratory system and cause respiratory
disease, asthma, decreased lung function, and death.79 PM's
effect on human health depends partly on the size of the

71. COOPER & ALLEY, supra note 70, at 101.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Jeff Fedorchak, Air War: EPA's extreme PM proposal, FOUNDRY
MGMT. & TECH., Dec. 1, 1996, at 34,1996 WL 8800467.
75. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
76. See generally EPA, Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter and
Sulfur Oxides, No. EPA-600!8-82-029a, at 1-94 (1982); see also KIELY, supra
note 70, at 334 (describing the 1952 London "fog" as a catalyst for air pollution
regulation around the world).
77. See EPA, supra note 76, at -029a to -029c.
78. EPA, Fact Sheet: EPA's Revised Particulate Matter Standards, http://
www.epa.gov!ttnloarpg/naaqsfin/pmfact.html (July 17, 1997) [hereinafter
Revised Particulale Matter Standards]. The EPA identified a number of
studies indicating that the health effects of PM exposure include premature
death, increased hospital admissions and emergency room visits, increased
respiratory and lung symptoms, and disease. Id.; see also Health Effects
Institute, supra note 3 (citing a July, 2000 report by the Health Effects
Institute confirming the results of these health studies).
79. See 1997 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 38,654; Joseph M. Feller, Nonthreshold Pollutants and Air Quality Standards, 24 ENVTL. L. 821, 839 (1994).
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particle. 8o As a result, the EPA bases its regulation on the size
and ambient concentration of the particles. 81
Before the EPA issued its controversial revised PM
standard, the last PM NAAQS review occurred in 1987. 82 In
that review, the EPA included all particles with an
aerodynamic diameter of less than ten micrometers (PM1o) in
its measurements. 83 The aerodynamic diameter of a particle is
the diameter of a hypothetical sphere (with a unit density of
water) that will settle in still air at the same velocity as the
particular particle. 84
In 1987, the EPA set two primary standard levels for PMone measured daily, and the other measured every three
years. 85 The EPA, while promulgating the 1997 PM revisions,
assessed public health protection under the 1987 levels.
D. THE AGENCY'S DECISION: THE 1997 REVISED PM

STANDARD

In April 1994, the EPA announced its intent to revise the
PM Air Quality Criteria Document. 86 Initially, the EPA
produced an air quality criteria document87 and a staff paper
summarizing the scientific basis for regulating PM.88 On
80. Revised Particulate Matter Standards, supra note 78. Size matters
because smaller particles can get farther into the lungs' sensitive airways
causing more damage. Id.
81. 1997 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 38,654.
82. See generally Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Particulate Matter: Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,634 (July 1,
1987) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter 1987 Final Rule].
83., [d.
84. COOPER & ALLEY, supra note 70, at 101. For example, if a particle
weighs one kilogram and has a three-inch diameter, its aerodynamic diameter
would be the diameter of a one-kilogram sphere of water. The aerodynamic
diameter is based only on the mass of the particle, not on its actual size.
Therefore, a one-kilogram particle would have the same aerodynamic diameter
if it were three inches or three feet wide.
85. 1987 Final Rule, supra note 82, at 24,634. Specifically, the EPA set
the primary PMlO standard at 50 J.1g/m3, the expected annual arithmetic mean,
averaged over three years, and 150 J.1g/m3 , the twenty-four hour average, with
only one exceedance allowed per year. [d.
86. See Am. Lung Ass'n v. Browner, 884 F. Supp. 345, 349 (D. Ariz. 1994)
(ordering publication of EPA's final PM rule by January 31,1997); 1997 Final
Rule, supra note 2, at 38,654.
87. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
88. 1997 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 38,654. The CASAC reviewed the
criteria document and commented that "although our understanding of the
health effects of PM is far from complete, a revised Criteria Document which
incorporates the Panel's latest comments will provide an adequate review of
the available scientific data and relevant studies of PM." [d. (quoting Letter
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November 27,1996, the EPA officially announced its decision to
revise the PM NAAQS after reviewing the 1987 standard. 89
The EPA's review of the old standard focused primarily on the
adverse health effects90 caused by fine particulates (P~.s)91 and
coarse particulates (PM10-2.s).92 The epidemiological studies
convincingly93 demonstrated that the presence of PM causes
increased health problems. 94 Moreover, the scientific evidence
overwhelmingly demonstrated the need to regulate coarse and
fine particulates separately.95
In addition to examjning
scientific studies, the EPA solicited public comment and many

from George T. Wolff, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, to Carol
M. Browner, EPA Administrator (March 15, 1996)). Additionally, the CASAC
commented that "the Staff Paper, when revised, will provide an adequate
summary of our present understanding of the scientific basis for making
regulatory decisions concerning PM standards." Id. (quoting Letter from
George T. Wolff, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, to Carol M.
Browner, EPA Administrator (June 13, 1996)).
89. See National Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter: Proposed
Decision, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,638 (Dec. 13, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50)
[hereinafter 1996 Proposed Decision].
90. See 1997 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 38,655. The Agency's ultimate
conclusion to revise the standards focused on an evaluation of health effects, a
quantitative health risk assessment, and a calculation of an adequate margin
of safety. Id.
91. Id. at 38,654. The criteria found that fine and coarse particulates
differ by source, formation process, chemical properties, and physical
properties. Id. Fine particulates are those particles with an aerodynamic
diameter of less than 2.5 micrometers. Id.
92. Id. Coarse particulates are those particles with an aerodynamic
diameter of between 2.5 and 10 micrometers (PM'()'2.5). Id.
93. See id. at 38,657. The EPA stated that "[g]iven the nature of the
health effects in question, this finding, which is based on a large number of
studies that used PM lO measurements, as well as studies using other
indicators of PM, clearly indicates that revision of the current PM NAAQS is
appropriate." Id. Additionally, the majority of comments received from the
public reiterated the view that the PM NAAQS needed to be revised to protect
public health. Id. Moreover, several state and local governments commented
that new air quality standards for fine PM were necessary to protect the
public. Id.
94. Id. at 38,656-57. The CASAC felt the evidence of PM effects was
"fairly strong" because a majority of studies demonstrated increased
respiratory problems. Id. at 38,656 n.7. Although the Committee noted that
the results of the studies should be reviewed cautiously, the extensive
evidence indicated a health effect correlation to PM presence. Id. at 38,657.
95. Id. at 38,666. The majority of refinements to the PM NAAQS revolved
around defining the regulatory classes. See id. The PM regulations have
moved from regulating total suspended particles (TSP) to PMlO> in 1987, and
then, in 1997, to PM lO and PM..s. Id.
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of the comments came from an industry-led campaign to
prevent the revisions. 96
While making its final decision to revise the PM standards,
the EPA considered the air quality criteria document, the staff
paper, and public comment.97 After acknowledging that
scientific uncertainty is undoubtedly present in health-effects
related research, the EPA felt its "intensive evaluation" and
"high degree of scrutiny" provided an adequate basis for the
decision to revise the 1987 PM standard. 98
After determining that revisions were necessary, the EPA
next addressed how to revise the PM NAAQS to protect the
public. Initially, the Agency determined whether and where to
draw a line between fine and coarse particulates. 99 The EPA
elected to retain the coarse PM (PM1o) standard because at that
level "particles [are] capable of penetrating to the thoracic
region, including both the tracheobronchial and alveolar
regions"l00 thereby harming the human respiratory system.
96. See 1996 Proposed Decision, supra note 89, at 65,638. The EPA took
"extensive and unprecedented steps" to solicit public comment. 1997 Final
Rule, supra note 2, at 38,654. These steps included a toll-free telephone
hotline, comments submitted via e-mail, public hearings and meetings, and
satellite telecasts. Id.
97. 1997 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 38,655 ("After taking this
information and comments into account, and for the reasons discussed below
in this unit, the Administrator concludes that revisions to the current primary
standards to provide increased public health protection against a variety of
health risks are appropriate."). Studies used in the revision analysis were
completely reviewed in the criteria document and evaluated in the CASAC
process. Id. at 38,663.
98. Id. at 38,655 ("mn the judgment of the Administrator, this intensive
evaluation of the scientific evidence has provided an adequate basis for
regulatory decision making at this time, as well as for the comprehensive
research needs document recently developed by EPA, and reviewed by CASAC
and others, for improving our future understanding of the relationships
between ambient PM exposures and health effects.").
99. Id. at 38,658. Several environmental groups disagreed with the EPA
about where to draw the line because they disagreed with the Agency's
interpretation of the scientific findings. Id. Additionally, some environmental
groups favored certain foreign standards, such as the proposed British daily
PM10 standard of 50 llg/m3, which is only one-third of the 1987 U.S. standard.
Id. at 38,657-58. Alternatively, several groups representing business,
industry, and local government felt the proposed standards were
inappropriate because of the uncertainty of the scientific information. Id. at
38,658.
100. Id. at 38,666. The EPA relied on conclusions reached in the staff
paper and those made during the 1987 revision to reinstate the PM10 level. Id.
Additionally, the EPA found that recent information found in the criteria
document also supported this conclusion. Id. at 38,667.
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The EPA concluded, however, that the PMlO standard does not
adequately protect the public from the harmful effects of fine
particles.1 01 Accordingly, the EPA recommended a separate
regulation for fine particles. 102
Scientific evidence
demonstrated that the size differentiation between fine and
coarse particles lies somewhere between one and three
micrometers. 103
Thereafter, based on the CASAC's
recommendation, the air quality criteria document, the staff
paper, and public comment, the EPA chose the 2.5 micrometer
size for fine PM.104 In sum, under the 1997 regulations, coarse
PM includes particles whose aerodynamic diameter105 is
between 2.5 and 10 micrometers; fine PM includes particles
under 2.5 micrometers. 106
The EPA next considered the level of PM exposure it would
allow under the new standards. 107 Focusing on fine PM (P~.5)'
the EPA decided that long and short-term levels were
necessary because health studies demonstrated the harmful
101. Id. Both the criteria document and the staff paper concluded that the
NAAQS should regulate fine and coarse PM separately. Id. The CASAC
stated that there was "a consensus that a new PM2.5 NAAQS be established."
Id. (quoting Letter from George T. Wolff, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory
Committee, to Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator (June 13, 1996». The
main reason for separating coarse and fine particulates is because they are
physically and chemically different. Id.
102. Id. As the EPA noted, the epidemiological evidence demonstrated that
the most effective way to protect the public was to regulate fine particles
separately. Id. In particular, the staff paper suggested that fine particles are
more directly linked to mortality and that a regulatory focus would control
other gaseous precursors. Id.
103. Id. The EPA recognized the scientific data supported a cut-off point
somewhere in this range. Id.
104. Id. at 38,668. The staff paper and the criteria document both
recommended using the 2.5 mark. Id. The National Mining Association,
however, suggested a smaller cutoff point at one micrometer (PMl ). Id. at
38,668 n.27. The EPA rejected this suggestion because, although it would
reduce the intrusion of coarse particles, it would also omit some PM
components from regulation including acid sulfates, nitrates, and various
organic compounds. Id.
105. E.g., supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing aerodynamic
diameter).
106. 1997 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 38,668. The EPA followed the staff
and CASAC recommendations to use P~.5 as the appropriate indicator for fine
PM. Id. Several CASAC members felt that coarse particulates should be
measured by PMl 0-2.5. Id. A majority of the committee, however, found it
reasonable to measure PM lO by itself as an indicator for coarse PM. Id.
107. Id. Although the EPA considered the acceptable levels for both
standards, this Comment only details the EPA's decision concerning PM2.5,
even though PMlo encountered similar analysis.
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effects of poth long and short-term exposure to fine PM.108
Based upon the CASAC's recommendations and public health
concerns,109 the EPA decided that a short-term regulation
would measure fine PM concentrations over twenty-four hour
periods.1 10 The EPA found that the long-term regulation and
regulatory focus should be on annual concentrations.1 11 Next,
the Administrator determined the levels for the twenty-four
hour and the annual P~.5 standards. The EPA primarily
considered the health effects discussed in the staff paper and
the criteria document to determine a level of PM exposure
sufficient to protect public health and provide an adequate
margin of safety for the public. ll2 These considerations led to a
108. Id. at 38,668-69.
109. Id. at 38,669. A clear majority of CASAC members supported the
standards. Id. Seventeen out of nineteen recommended the twenty-four hour
standard and thirteen out of nineteen recommended the annual standard. Id.
at 38,669 n.28. Additionally, the EPA noted that a single standard would
result in "either inadequate protection for some effects, or unnecessarily
stringent control for others." Id. at 38,669. Both standards would work
together effectively and efficiently to achieve cleaner air. See id. Although the
annual standard may be difficult to implement, the EPA believed it would
greatly reduce exposure to harmful PM. Id. at 38,670. Furthermore, the EPA
felt that an annual standard reflecting area-wide exposure combined with a
twenty-four hour standard for peak and seasonal protection, would adequately
protect public health. Id. at 38,672.
110. Id. at 38,668. The Administrator found a twenty-four hour standard
would protect against episodes lasting several days. Id. Additionally,
although some effects occur at smaller time increments, the EPA found that
none of the studies provided an adequate basis for a different regulation. Id.
Furthermore, the EPA recognized that twenty-four hour regulations will likely
lead to reductions in shorter-term concentrations. Id.
111. Id. at 38,668-69. The EPA reasoned that more risk is associated with
long-term exposure. Id. at 38,669. Additionally, long-term exposure is the
primary source of knowledge of the health effects of PM. See id. at 38,670.
Therefore, using the annual standard as the controlling standard will lead to
more consistent risk reductions. See id.
The EPA considered seasonal measuring as an alternative. Id. at 38,669.
However, the EPA found there was insufficient evidence to create a standard
measured by seasonal averaging times. Id. Instead, the EPA decided to use
the annual arithmetic mean, an average over three years, as the annual PM2.5
standard because the mean more accurately reflects area-wide PM exposure.
Id. at 38,671. An annual arithmetic mean is more accurate because a single
monitor with the highest measured values does not illustrate the overall
quality of the air. Id.
112. Id. at 38,674. Seeking to set a standard that would reduce U.S. PM
pollution to an adequate level, the EPA considered the need to provide for
variations in seasonal levels, supra note 111, and looked at the combined
protection from the annual and twenty-four hour standards. 1997 Final Rule,
supra note 2, at 38,669. In particular, the EPA balanced several factors when
making its decision: (1) the protection provided by the twenty-four hour
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final decision for the annual standard113 and the twenty-four
hour standard. 114
The new levels will provide greater
protection to the public than the less stringent and less
comprehensive 1987 PM standards.
Although the EPA based its decision to revise the PM
standards on over sixty peer-reviewed and debated scientific
studies,115 the industry-sponsored Air Quality Coalition
(AQC),116 claimed that the standards were not supported by
science. ll7 The AQC represented seven hundred companies,
trade associations, and business groups that spent millions of
dollars to prevent the EPA from revising the NAAQS, while
supporting legislation to roll back these standards. 118 Because
the predominant concern of the AQC is the cost associated with
increased regulation, one commentator characterized the
debate over the new standards as a battle between human lives

standard; (2) the combined protection from the twenty-four hour and annual
standard; (3) the scientific study information; (4) the uncertainties of the risks
in the scientific data; (5) the PM levels recommended by the CASAC; and (6)
public comment. Id. at 38,677. The strengths and weaknesses of the study
were also interpreted by the CASAC members. Id. The Agency also
considered public comment urging more or less stringent standards but
ultimately rejected these suggestions. Id. at 38,675. Realizing the scientific
uncertainties present in the data, the EPA proposed pursuing an expanded
research program to improve implementation. Id.
113. Id. at 38,679. Specifically, the annual standard requires a 15 llg/m3 or
lower concentration for a three-year average. Id. The EPA chiefly relied on
U.S. and Canadian studies listed in the staff paper to make this decision. Id.
at 38,675. The staff paper found the presence of significant negative health
effects associated with a mean PM concentrations between 16 and 21 llg/m3.
Id. at 38,676. Based on these studies and conclusions, the EPA found that all
the values for finding a correlation of PM to negative health effects were
greater than 15 llg/m3. Id. The Agency concluded that this level provided an
adequate margin of safety. Id. at 38,677.
114. Id. at 38,679. The twenty-four hour standard requires that "the 3year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour PM2.5 concentrations at each
population-oriented monitor within an area is less than or equal to 65 llg/m3
...." Id.
115. See Browner Prepared Statement on Decision, supra note 18.
116. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., Air Quality Coalition, at http://www.nam.
org/rer/Air/index.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2000) (recruitment page for the
Air Quality Coalition); Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr., Issue Ads 97-98: Air
Quality Standards Coalition, at http://appcpenn.org/issueadslprofilesl
aicquality.htm (last modified Oct. 12, 1998).
117. Akiko Allison Gotoh, Conflict over Air Quality Standards, at
http://mamba.bio.uci.edul-pjbryantlgloballsen_semlgotoh97.htm
(Feb.
5,
1997).
118. See supra note 116.
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and economic expenditures.1l9 Not surprisingly, the revised
PM standards caused considerable debate in Congress.120
When the AQC's lobbying effort proved unsuccessful, the
debate moved to the courts. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia121 received numerous
petitions requesting judicial review of the primary and
secondary PM NAAQS122 and the petitions were filed
predominately by associations whose membership would be
adversely affected by the new standards. 123
II. AMERICAN TRUCKING'S ROADBLOCK IMPAIRS THE
PUBLIC'S PROTECTION AGAINST HARMFUL
PARTICULATE MATTER.
The D.C. Circuit consolidated the petitions for review of
the revised PM standard into one case and a three-judge panel
heard the matter on December 17, 1998. The panel vacated the
standards and the EPA petitioned the court for rehearing en
banco Although the D.C. Circuit Court denied the petition for
rehearing, the Supreme Court granted the EPA's petition for a
writ of certiorari and will hear the case this Fall. 124

119. Gotoh, supra note 117.
120. See Salvaging Air Quality Standards, supra note 6. For example,
Representatives Klink, Upton, and Boucher introduced a bill to delay the
implementation of the revisions for four years. H.R. 1984, 105th Congo (1997).
This bill was never enacted although it had up to 197 co-sponsors.
121. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7607(b)(1), (d)(8) (1994). If a standard issued by the
EPA has national applicability or if a party alleges a procedural rulemaking
error, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
hears any petition for judicial review. ld.
122. Am. Trucking Ass'ns V. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. granted sub
nom. Am. Trucking Ass'ns V. EPA, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. May 30, 2000) (No.
99-1426); Browner V. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (U.S. May 22,
2000) (No. 99-1257). The court's authority arises under statute. Supra note
121. Specifically, the court addressed challenges to the 1997 PM NAAQS and
the 1997 Ozone NAAQS. See, e.g.,Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033; 1997 Final
Rule, supra note 2, at 38,652, 38,856.
123. The majority of the associations petitioning for review of the revisions
are also members of the AQC. See supra note 116. These organizations
include the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Mining
Association, the American Petroleum Institute, the American Trucking
Associations, and the Chemical Manufacturers Associations. ld.
124. 120 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. May 30, 2000) (No. 99-1426); 120 S. Ct. 2003
(U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257). Oral argument is scheduled for November
7,2000.
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A. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S CHALLENGE TO THE EPA: FIND AN
"INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE" FOR PM RULE PROMULGATION.
In American Trucking, the D.C. Circuit scrutinized the
revised PM standard. The majority opinion, authored jointly by
Judges Williams and Ginsburg,125 began by examining the
EPA's authority to promulgate PM regulations 126 and
recognized that the EPA must choose a PM level "'requisite" to
protect the public health' with an 'adequate margin of
safety.'" 127 Applying this congressional mandate to PM, the
court assumed that PM was a non-threshold pollutant, which
means the only safe concentration exists at zero.128 Based on
this assumption, the court concluded the EPA must explain any
regulation level above zero for PM because any non-zero level
could potentially risk public health. 129
Next, the court
examined the criteria used during the rulemaking procedure. 130
The court found that the factors used to determine the
regulations' impact on public health were reasonable. l3l
Nevertheless, the court decided that the EPA had failed to
state an "intelligible principle" under which to apply the
factors. 132
125. Both Judge Williams and Judge Ginsburg were appointed by
President Reagan.
126. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. The small business petitioners urged
this issue to the court arguing that the EPA's loose construction of the CAA
amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of power by Congress. [d.
127. [d. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994»; see also 42 U.S.C. §
7409(d)(1) (stating that the EPA must "promulgate such new standards
[NAAQS] as may be appropriate in accordance with ... [§ 7409(b)]"). Some
critics consider this part of the opinion to be dicta. See, e.g., Kass &
McCarroll, supra note 27, at 3,6 (asserting that the delegation issue was not
the main holding of the American Trucking decision).
128. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. The court assumed PM was a nonthreshold pollutant although this status was not officially confirmed by the
EPA. See id.
129. [d. The court noted that it is not feasible to have the PM regulations
set at zero because this would lead to the end ofindustriaIization. [d. at 1038
n.4.
130. [d. at 1034-35. The EPA's criteria for ruIemaking decisions, according

to the opinion, include the seriousness of the effect, likelihood ofthe effect, and
the number of people affected. [d. at 1035.
131. [d. at 1034.
132. [d. at 1034. The court noted the EPA did state what it would base its
evaluation on but it "revealed no cut-off point." [d. Although the court hinted
at a delegation problem, it found the EPA's criteria did not result in an
"inherent nondelegation problem." [d. at 1034. Nevertheless, the court found
that the EPA failed to show any definite criteria for determining a threshold
level for the regulations. [d.
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The court concluded that the EPA's explanation for the
revised PM standard amounted only to a hollow assertion that
negative health effects are less likely at lower levels of
exposure.1 33 While it recognized that the EPA has discretion to
make "policy judgment [s]" when faced with scientific
uncertainty,134 the court found that the basis for the EPA's
regulation would allow it to choose and regulate any PM
level,135 thereby giving the EPA too much discretion. 136 As a
result, the court challenged the EPA to create a determinate
standard for the NAAQS and remanded the case to the EPA
directing the Agency to identify a constitutional construction of
the CAA.137 The court reasoned that a determinate standard
will ensure that the EPA's decisions are not arbitrary and that
judicial review is meaningful.138
As a starting point, the court suggested that the EPA
examine a generic unit of harm as a possible solution to the
regulations'indeterminacy.139 The court cited a method used in
Oregon to calculate welfare distribution for healthcare
133. Id. at 1035. The court quoted language from the final ozone rule as a
basis for this assertion. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the EPA based
its regulations on the CASAC's recommendation of specific standards, but the
CASAC did not offer reasons for its recommendation. Id. at 1035-36.
Furthermore, the majority disregarded the dissent's argument for deference to
this highly intellectual scientific body because "the question whether EPA
acted pursuant to lawfully delegated authority is not a scientific one." Id. at
1036. Moreover, the court suggested that the EPA could defend its decision to
set a standard at a certain level by identifying a tolerable level of uncertainty.
Id. at 1036.
134. Id. at 1037.
135. Id. at 1036. The court used London's 1952 "Killer Fog" as an example
of the different standards the EPA could set under its criteria. Id.
Specifically, the court noted that the "EPA's formulation of its policy judgment
leaves it free to pick any point between zero and a hair below the
concentrations yielding London's Killer Fog." Id. at 1037. Additionally, the
court noted that the EPA did cite evidence to support the PM standard but
found that its evidence did not demonstrate the health effects at the revised
standard. Id. at 1037 n.2.
136. Id. at 1037.
137. Id. at 1038. The court stated that it did not want to hold the statute
unconstitutional if the Agency could salvage it. Id.
138. Id.; ~ee also Friedland & Williamson, supra note 29 (noting that the
opportunity for the EPA to select new standards is a new and interesting
approach).
139. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1039-40. This suggestion was modeled
after Oregon's health care approach. Id. at 1039. The court reasoned that "an
agency wielding the power over American life possessed by EPA should be
capable of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit of harm that takes
into account population affected, severity, and probability." Id.
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recipients using "Quality-Adjusted Life Years." In this method,
welfare payments are calculated by dividing a treatment's
"Quality-Adjusted Life Years" benefit by the treatment's cost.140
The court admitted, however, that it might be difficult for the
EPA to conceive a similar standard because it may not consider
economic cost in its decision-making.1 41
In addition, the court scrutinized the EPA's decision to use
PMlO as a coarse particulate indicator. 142 The court found that
the EPA adequately supported its decision to regulate coarse
PM.143 It rejected, however, the EPA's decision to use PM10 as
the coarse particulate indicator.l44 The court reasoned that the
indicator would regulate more than coarse particles in the air,
essentially leading to undesirable "double regulation" of fine
PM and under-regulation of coarse PM.145 Furthermore, the
court rejected the argument that using PMlO as an indicator
would be practical because feasibility can not be considered
when promulgating the NAAQS.146 As a result of these

140. ld.
Oregon's health care approach for low-income individuals
measures the probability and duration of an illness with or without a specified
treatment. ld. at 1039 n.5. Next, the state polls its citizens to ascertain how
highly they value various levels of health. ld. These factors are used to
calculate a unit of harm and allocate resources among those who need it. ld.
141. ld. at 1039. In the second part of the opinion, the court reaffirmed
that the EPA could not consider costs when revising standards. ld. at 1040.
The court also rejected several claims by the petitioners and amici asserting
that the EPA should have considered additional criteria while revising the PM
and ozone NAAQS. ld.
142. ld. at 1053. This part of the opinion was authored by Judge Tatel.
The court began its analysis by defining coarse and fine particles. ld. Coarse
particles result from crushing or grinding solids and generally have diameters
between 2.5 and ten micrometers. ld. Fine particles result from combustion
or gas processes and have diameters of 2.5 micrometers or less. ld.
143. ld. The court pointed to two studies and nine multivariable analyses
supporting the EPA's decision to regulate coarse PM at the 1997 levels. ld. at
1053-54. The court commented on the limitations of judicial review stating
that review only acts in "'ascertaining that the choices made by the
Administrator were reasonable and supported by the record. m ld. (quoting
Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1980».
144. ld. at 1054. The EPA argued that (1) all the studies use the PMlO
indicator in the models; (2) both the PMlO standard and P~5 standard will
work in conjunction; and (3) a nationwide monitoring program for PM,o is
already in existence. ld.
145. ld. at 1054-55.
146. ld. at 1054-55 (quoting NRDC v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 973 (D.C. Cir.
1980». In contrast, the EPA argued that using PM,o is pragmatic because
monitoring systems for this level already exist. ld. at 1054.
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findings, the court held that the decision to use PM10 as an
indicator was "arbitrary and capricious." 147
In his dissent, Judge Tatel disagreed with the majority's
assertion that the EPA did not use a determinate standard for
developing the regulations. 148 The judge found that the CANs
"air quality criteria" provided a sufficient basis to make a
regulation "requisite" to protect public health.149 Additionally,
he determined that the record reflected an adherence to a
"disciplined decision-making process."150 Judge Tatel concluded
that the EPA did not pick arbitrary points for the
regulations. 151 The judge noted that if people disagree with the
EPA's decision-making procedure, they should voice their
opinion through the legislative process. I52

B.

THE DENIAL OF REHEARING

The EPA petitioned the whole court for rehearing en banc
challenging the panel's conclusion that the EPA failed to
articulate an "intelligible principle" while promulgating the
1997 revised PM standard. 153 The EPA argued that an
147. ld. at 1054-55
148. ld. at 1057-62 (Tatel, J., dissenting); see also Friedland & Williamson,
supra note 29 (characterizing the dissent as "a vociferous dissent to the nondelegation portion of the otherwise unaninlOus opinion, attacking the twojudge majority for misapplying non-delegation principles and for giving short
shrift to the evidence supporting EPA's choice ofNAAQS levels").
149. ld. at 1058. Judge Tatel alluded to 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (1994),
which requires criteria "to the extent practicable" to
include information on-(A) those variable factors (including
atmospheric conditions) which of themselves or in combination with
other factors may alter the effects on public health or welfare of such
air pollutant; (B) the types of air pollutants which, when present in
the atmosphere, may interact with such pollutant to produce an
adverse effect on public health or welfare; and (C) any known or
anticipated adverse effects on welfare.
ld.
150. ld. at 1059. Judge Tatel recognized that the EPA based its decision on
the "latest scientific knowledge," the regulation was "requisite to protect the
public health," and the decisions were made within the scope set by the
CASAC (the independent advisory committee required by 42 U.S.C. §
7409(d)(2». ld.
151. ld. at 1061.
152. ld. In reaction to this case, two bills have been introduced in
Congress to address the power of agency decisionmaking. See Congressional
Responsibility Act of 1999, H.R. 2301, 106th Congo (1999); S. 1348, 106th
Congo (1999).
153. Am. Trucking Ass'ns V. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Trucking Ass'ns V. EPA, 120 S. Ct. 2193
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intelligible principle was apparent in the statute. 154
Accordingly, the EPA's discretion was limited by the statute,
which requires that the regulations be set at a level "requisite"
to protect public health. I55 The agency also claimed this
limitation was used as a basis for creating a determinate
level. 156 Moreover, the EPA quoted other statutory language
and legislative history to show the presence of a determinate
principle. 157 The EPA further challenged the limitations the
panel's decision placed on their considerations when
promulgating the NAAQS.I58
The court, in a per curiam opinion supported by four
judges,I59 recognized that the EPA employs a balancing process
to choose among ambiguous principles. I60 The court stated it
would look at these balanced choices to determine whether an
intelligible principle exists. 161 However, the court found it

(u.s. May 30, 2000) (No. 99-1426); Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S. Ct.
2003 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257).
154. Id. at 6.
155. Id. The court disregarded the EPA's assertions stating, "[iln its briefs
defending the NAAQS, the EPA merely asserted that the Clean Air Act
provides an intelligible principle; it failed both to state that principle and to
argue that its revised NAAQS were promulgated in accordance with that
principle." Id. at 7.
156. Id. at 6.
157. Id.
158. Id. The EPA challenged the panel's decision which found that the
"EPA must consider positive identifiable effects of a pollutant's presence in the
ambient air in formulating air quality criteria under § 108 and NAAQS under
§ 109." Id. (citing Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1052).
159. Judge Williams (Reagan appointee), Judge Ginsburg (Reagan
appointee), Judge Sentelle (Reagan appointee), and Judge Randolph {Bush
appointee} did not support rehearing. Although only four judges supported
the denial, rehearing was denied because two judges did not participate in the
opinion. Six judges must support rehearing the case for it to be reheard.
160. See Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 8.
161. Id. The court interpreted Industrial Union Department v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) [The Benzene Casel, as unaffected by
Chevron. Id. The court noted that Justice Stevens' plurality opinion found the
Occupational Health and Safety Act required "a threshold finding ... that
significant risks are present." Indus. Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 642. The court
noted that this was evidence that previous courts examined statutes for
intelligible principles even though this method was implicitly rejected by the
Chevron Court. See Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 8. Judge Silberman disagreed
with the court's interpretation of Industrial Union Department. Id. at 14
(Silberman, J., dissenting). He believed that the Supreme Court just inserted
the delegation principle at the last minute merely paying "lip service" to the
doctrine. Id.
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could not determine the sufficiency162 of the asserted
intelligible principle' Until it is applied in practice. 163
Consequently, it denied the EPA's petition for rehearing.
Five judges dissented and supported rehearing. l64 Judge
Silberman believed that the CAA's statutory language did not
create a determinacy problem. Specifically, the judge found the
court's reliance on the nondelegation doctrine to be
"fundamentally unsound."165 Judge Silberman reasoned that
by directing the EPA to narrow Congress's delegation, the court
undermined the primary function of the nondelegation
doctrine. 166 The main purpose of the doctrine, according to
Judge Silberman, is to ensure Congress makes important policy
decisions. 167 Therefore, the court should not require an agency
to narrow a broad congressional delegation because it takes
away congressional power to make these essential choices. 168
Moreover, Judge Silberman argued the court should have
applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review rather
than engaging in a searching review of the decision. 169 In
162. To interpret the sufficiency of the intelligible principle, the court
stated it would look at the history, context, and purpose of the CAA. Am.
Trucking, 195 F.3d at 7 (citing Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947);
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946); Fed. Radio Comm'n v.
Nelson Bros. Bond & Mort. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933)).
163. Id. The court defended its earlier per curiam opinion issued by the
three-judge panel. Id. It found that the EPA "merely asserted" that the CAA
established an intelligible principle without saying what the principle was or if
it had been followed. Id.
164. Judge Edwards (Carter appointee), Judge Silberman (Reagan
appointee), Judge Rogers (Clinton appointee), Judge Tatel (Clinton appointee),
and Judge Garland (Clinton appointee) supported rehearing.
165. Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 14 (Silberman, J., dissenting).

wa

R~~

.

167. Id. at 15. Judge Silberman admitted that the panel recognized its
decision thwarted this purpose. Id. at 15 n.2. However, the panel believed its
decision was supported by the two other purposes ofthe doctriIie: nonarbitrary
decision-making and meaningful judicial review. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at
1038. Judge Silberman, however, felt these rationales were collateral to the
primary function of the doctrine, that is, forcing Congress to make crucial
policy decisions. Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 15 n.2.
168. Id. at 15. Judge Silberman believed that it does not make sense to
give the EPA such authority because Congress is elected to make these crucial
policy choices. Id. By giving ultimate responsibility to the Agency, the court
would give Congress unlimited power to delegate without any specificity
because the Agency will have to determine the "intelligible principle." See id.
169. Id. at 15-16. See generally Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). In American Lung Ass'n, the court examined a procedural issue
arising out of Section 109 of the CAA and did not find the section
unconstitutional. Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 16-17. Instead, the court applied
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summary, he asserted that the court overstepped its bounds by
reinvigorating the nondelegation doctrine and requiring
subsequent agency action. 170
Despite the dissent's arguments, the D.C. Circuit denied
rehearing by a vote of 5 to 4.171 Consequently, the EPA needs
to identify and follow an intelligible principle to create the new
NAAQS PM standards. Unless reversed, this decision could
have a widespread effect on separation of powers jurisprudence
and on the EPA's ability to protect Americans from harmful air
pollutants.
II. AMERICAN TRUCKING TOOK A WRONG TURN AND
RISKS THE PUBLIC'S PROTECTION AGAINST HARMFUL
PARTICULATE MATTER.
American Trucking erred by preventing implementation of
the revised PM standards unless the EPA articulates an
"intelligible principle" to promulgate the NAAQS.1 72 The court
mistakenly looked for an "intelligible principle" in the EPA's
actions and ignored precedent that focused on statutory
language. Consequently, this decision severely undermines the
nondelegation doctrine by stripping Congress of its power to
delegate authority to regulating agencies. Moreover, American
Trucking should have analyzed the EPA's regulatory decisions
under the arbitrary and capricious standard rather than
employing a searching constitutional inquiry.173 If the court
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review finding that the EPA failed to
adequately explain where Section 109 applied to its analysis. Id.
170. Id. at 15-16. ("By treating this case as a statutory interpretation
question laden with constitutional implications the panel implicitly asserts a
greater role for a reviewing court than is justified.").
171. Id. at 4.
172. Surprisingly, the issue of judicial inquiry into the presence of an
"intelligible principle" was not raised by the petitioners and was not essential
to the decision. See Kass & McCarroll, supra note 27, at 3 (contending that
the court placed the nondelegation part of the opinion in Part I of the opinion
"before it was evident that much, if not all of the delegation analysis was not
essential to the decision").
173. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,1061 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(per curiam) (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("Whether EPA failed to live up to the
principles it established for itself has nothing to do with our inquiry under the
non-delegation doctrine. Those issues relate to whether the NAAQS are
arbitrary and capricious. . . . The constitution requires that Congress
articulate intelligible principles; Congress has done so here."), modified, 195
F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns v. EPA, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. May 30, 2000) (No. 99-1426); Browner v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1257).
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had correctly focused on the CANs statutory language, it would
have found a determinate principle.

A. THE COURT ERRED BY SEARCHING FOR AN "INTELLIGIBLE
PRINCIPLE" IN THE EPA's ACTIONS RATHER THAN THE STATUTE.
To determine whether the 1997 PM NAAQS revision
procedure presented a delegation problem, American Trucking
examined the Agency's actions. The court scrutinized the
EPA's reasoning in determining its final rule for an intelligible
principle, which would provide a determinate criterion for
making its decisions. 174 The court concluded that the EPA did
not follow an intelligible principle and held that the EPA, not
Congress, needed to adopt one and make the "fundamental
policy choices."175
The D.C. Circuit's requirement that the Agency create an
"intelligible principle" reflects the court's fundamental
misunderstanding of the nondelegation doctrine and the proper
scope of judicial review of agency decisions. By requiring the
EPA to narrow its statutory discretion, the court undercut the
purposes of the nondelegation doctrine, ignored precedent, and
failed to apply the correct standard of review to the Agency's
decision.

1. The Court's Focus on the EPA's Action Undermines the
Functions of the N ondelegation Doctrine.
The court's decision to force the EPA to articulate its own
"intelligible principle" contradicts all three functions of the
nondelegation doctrine. Specifically, the decision fails to (1)
ensure that important policy choices are made by Congress; (2)
guarantee that Congress guides agency action with an
"intelligible principle"; and (3) guarantee meaningful judicial
reviewP6
First, making the EPA determine the scope of its own
authority strips Congress of an important policy choice 177
because, according to the court's ruling, the EPA, not Congress,
will decide how much administrative discretion it has in
174. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
175. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038.
176. See Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
177. See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038 (admitting this deficiency in its

decision).
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making future PM decisions. Consequently, the decision
directly contradicts the constitutional principle that Congress
should make important policy choices. 178 If any change in the
CAA needs to be made, Congress must do it, not the Agency.179
American Trucking also placed considerable power in the
unelected judiciary by giving courts the power, without a
discernible standard for judicial intervention, to strike down an
agency decision, when it finds an agency has not "adequately"
narrowed its statutory delegation. 180 American Trucking
removes power from the people by shifting legislative duties
meant for the elected Congress to the unelected EPA and the
courts.
Second, the court's decision fails to guarantee that
Congress will furnish agencies with an "intelligible principle"
for decision-making. The court misinterpreted this function of
the nondelegation doctrine by characterizing it as avoiding nonarbitrary decision-making. The Supreme Court, however, has
specifically stated that the second function of the doctrine is to
force Congress, not an agency, to articulate a guide for agency
decision-making. 181 American Trucking directly contradicted
this function because the court issued the EPA a "blank check"
to articulate its guiding principles. In other words, according to
American Trucking, Congress has no constitutional burden to
meet because an agency has the duty to ensure that the
delegation is constitutional.
Hypothetically, under this
rationale, Congress could tell the EPA to "regulate air" because
Congress does not have to provide an "intelligible principle";
rather this would be the Agency's responsibility. Therefore,
178. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
179. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(stating that neither the court nor the EPA can change the NAAQS rule
promulgation policy that does not consider cost or technological feasibility); cf.
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). In TVA, the court followed the text of
the Endangered Species Act hinting that only Congress may institute change
if it is needed. See id.
180. The result in American Trucking is ironic considering the
circumstances under which the nondelegation doctrine was revived. The
American Trucking majority and other "strict constructionalists" opine that
judges should not make public policy. See supra note 125 (describing the
American Trucking panel majority); supra note 38 (describing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's suggestion to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine). The
implicit transfer of power to the judiciary clearly contradicts Chevron and
other cases that emphasize a deferential role for the courts in reviewing
agency decisionmaking.
181. Compare Indus. Union Dept., 448 U.S. at 607, with Am. Trucking, 195
F.3dat 15.
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under this hypothetical, the EPA would have to determine how
to make Congress's "regulate air" instruction constitutional
under the nondelegation doctrine. This would plainly violate
the second function of the nondelegation doctrine by not
requiring Congress to articulate a guide for agency action.
Third, meaningful judicial review is less feasible when a
court focuses on the EPA's actions rather than statutory
language. Due to the EPA's scientific knowledge, the Agency
could create an intelligible principle using scientific theory and
terminology. 182 Although any theoretical scientific procedure
should be evaluated using scientific principles, a court would
evaluate it under legal principles. 183 Consequently, judicial
review will probably be less meaningful because courts
interpreting technical procedures generally give more deference
to an agency's scientific expertise. 184 Hence, courts will not be
able to adequately review an agency's actions when the guide
(the delegation) is written in terms that are difficult to
interpret. Therefore, American Trucking's focus on the EPA's
actions directly contradicts the purposes of the nondelegation
doctrine by removing power from Congress and making
meaningful judicial review less feasible.
2. The Court Ignored Precedent by Analyzing the EPA's
Actions For an Intelligible Principle.
Other courts searching for determinate principles have
focused on statutory language. Congress, not an agency, must
provide an "intelligible principle" to direct an agency's power.I 85
This "intelligible principle" must be a defined and binding rule
of conduct. 186 To find an "intelligible principle," courts look to
182. See Pan Am. Grain Mfg. v. EPA, 95 F.3d 101, 103-05 (1st Cir. 1996)
(discussing the EPA's scientific expertise).
183. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("We must look
at the decision not as the chemist, biologist, or statistician that we are
qualified neither by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court
exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal
standards of rationality.").
184. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (describing the courts'
deference to an agency's technical expertise).
185. See Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467, 1473 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (stating that Congress provides the "intelligible principle," not the
agency) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).
186. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) ("The essentials
of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and
its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct...

.").
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Congress's statutory "command."187 An "intelligible principle"
can be derived from a statute's explicit words, purpose,
legislative history, and analogous regulatory schemes. 188
For example, in Touby v. United States the Supreme Court
looked at a statute and its textual constraints to determine
whether the Attorney General had the authority to control
substances posing an "imminent hazard to the public safety;" in
other words, whether the statute presented an "intelligible
principle."189 The Court found an "intelligible principle" in the
words of the statute and in the context in which the words were
used. 190 In addition, the Court referred to several other
statutes found to be constitutional. 191 The specific words of
those statutes provided the baseline for the determinate
principle, and the statutory context restricted this baseline. 192
Moreover, this type of inquiry has been followed in other
cases. 193 Therefore, courts should look for the delegation in the
statute because this is Congress's statement defining an
agency's discretion. 194 American Trucking erred by ignoring
this precedent and focusing on the EPA's actions rather than
the statute.
3. The Court Applied the Wrong Standard of Review.
Under earlier caselaw and the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA), the court should not have analyzed the EPA's
actions under a searching and careful constitutional review. 195
187. See id. at 424-25.
188. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337
F. Supp. 737, 746-48 (D.D.C. 1971).
189. Toubyv. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991).
190. ld.
191. ld. (citing cases in which the Court upheld terms such as "excessive
profits," "fair and equitable," and "public interest" as sufficiently determinate).
192. See id. at 165-66.
193. See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Milk Indus.
Found. v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 737; cf. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 783-84
(1948) (finding that an agency's interpretation of a statute can be one factor in
deriving an intelligible principle).
194. See Lovingv. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758-59 (1996).
The true distinction ... is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
ld. (citations omitted).
195. See supra Part LA (describing the standards of judicial review for
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American Trucking erred because Congress, not the EPA,
needs to develop constitutionally determinate standards for
agencies.I 96 Under the APA, an agency's factual decisions are
subject to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 197
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the
EPA must demonstrate that it looked at all the applicable
factors in its decision and did not commit a clear error in
judgment.198 The EPA's determination of the revised PM
standard should follow Section 109 of the CM and be
evaluated under this type of review.1 99 To demonstrate
compliance with the statute, the EPA must rely upon
substantial evidence200 in support of its decisions. 201
Essentially, the EPA must show that its decisions have a
reasonable basis202 and are not arbitrary and capricious.203
Courts apply this standard to limit agency discretion in the
same way the nondelegation doctrine restricts congressional
delegation. 204
agency decisions).
196. See supra Part ID.A.1; see also Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499
F.2d 467, 476 (D.C. Cir 1974).
197. Supra note 46 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
199. See Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 475 (stating that these judgments "are not
susceptible to the same type of verification or refutation by reference to the
record as are [other] factual questions").
200. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(recognizing the necessity of the Administrator's reliance on policy judgments
when the scientific evidence is not established); Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 475-76
(recognizing the need to make policy judgments). In Hodgson, the court found
that "the [Administrator] is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual
certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide the answer." ld.
201. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 647 F.2d at 1146; Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 474.
202. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 647 F.2d at 1146; see also Pan Am. Grain Mfg.
v. EPA, 95 F.3d 101, 103 (1st Cir. 1996). In Pan American Grain, the court
stated that in areas where the EPA's expertise is implicated, a court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the EPA. ld. at 105 (citing Mision Indus.,
Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 129 (1st Cir. 1976»; cf. Tex. Mun. Power Agency v.
EPA, 89 F.3d 858,869 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the EPA has discretion to
implement its regulations). The Texas Municipal Power court found that
although the EPA did not describe its proposed methodology for allocating an
emission rate for an electric utility facility, the EPA's conduct was not
irrational. ld. The court also found that "[i]n the absence of a rule or stated
policy on point, the EPA must possess a reasonable amount of discretion to
implement its own regulations." ld. (citing NRDC v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, ~148
(D.C. Cir. 1994».
203. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
204. See generally Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(remanding an EPA decision for a failure to explain the correlation of the
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American Trucking should have analyzed the EPA's
decision under an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
The court's primary concerns were that the Agency could set
PM standards at any level-even at a hazardous level-and
that the Agency had adopted a ''loose interpretation of the
statute."205 The court failed to recognize, however, that if the
standards were set at a hazardous level, they clearly would not
satisfy the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
Additionally, if the Agency truly did adopt a "loose
interpretation" of the statute,206 this would represent an abuse
of discretion and the decision would be invalidated under this
standard of review.
Consequently, American Trucking should have used the
arbitrary and capricious standard to resolve its concerns.
Furthermore, the court's searching constitutional review
directly violated the APA and precedent, which requires
judicial review of agency decisions under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review.
B. THE CAA CONVEYS AN "INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE," WHICH
THE EPA FOLLOWED.

If the court had correctly focused on the statute, it would
have found the "intelligible principle" for which it was
searching. The determinate standard articulated in Section
109 of the CAA is a disciplined decision-making procedure-an
. "intelligible principle." This procedure has been upheld by
earlier courts and is more definite than other sufficiently
determinate "intelligible principles." Furthermore, the EPA
correctly followed this intelligible principle when it
promulgated the 1997 PM standards.

regulation to a public health problem).
205. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. granted sub
nom. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (U.S. May 30,2000) (No.
99-1426); Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (U.S. May 22,
2000) (No. 99-1257).
206. In reality, the Agency did not adopt a "loose interpretation" of the
statute. See infra Part lILB.
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1. When Science Is Uncertain, a Determinate Standard for
Promulgating Health-Based Regulations Must Be a Disciplined
Decision-Making Procedure.
The D.C. Circuit's suggestion that the EPA create a
substantive standard for promulgating the NMQS ignores
reality. The only effective way to make an agency decision
determinate and accountable, while at the same time reflecting
changing science and values, is to follow a disciplined decisionmaking procedure.
Under the CM, the EPA must decide where the "requisite"
PM level (with an adequate margin of safety) exists. The level
"requisite" to protect public health is unclear for non-threshold
pollutants because the only level that could completely protect
public health is zero. This, .however, is not a realistic option
according to the EPA, Congress, and the cOurtS.207 When the
level is not zero, the EPA must make a policy judgment in the
absence of a determinate scientific leveI.208 The EPA must base
this policy judgment on changing science and the values
articulated by Congress in the CM. Forcing the Agency to
create a substantive formula to promulgate these standards
will either cause the formula to be too inflexible or the true
decision will be hidden under layers of artificial explanation.
For example, if the EPA develops a formula that only looks
at cancer risk to determine the public health risk, and later the
Agency determines that a pollutant also affects human hearing,
the EPA would be forced to either neglect the protection of
public health, violate its formula, or find a creative solution to
the dilemma. The statute's decision-making process is the only
way for the EPA to confront scientific uncertainty while
avoiding excessive agency discretion. 209
207. See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038 (recognizing that the EPA does
not advocate a zero-risk policy); NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1162-63 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (en bane) (finding that ample margin of safety for hazardous air
pollutants does not require a zero-risk policy). Attaining a PM level of zero is
theoretically impossible because the spreading of PM results partially from
natural sources such as wind.
208. See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. The EPA must, however, take
several factors into account when making its decisions. See supra Part LD.
209. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en
bane).
[W]e think it unlikely that science will ever yield absolute certainty of
safety in an area so complicated and rife with problems of
measurement, modeling, long latency, and the like.. " Congress
chose instead to deal with the pervasive nature of scientific
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The pre-established factors that guide Agency decisions
reflect congressional values and ensure that final standards are
not arbitrary. For example, the CAA's decision-making process
sets forth decision-making guidelines. The CAA's "intelligible
principle" mandates that the EPA must base its decisions on
the criteria document, the CASAC's opinion, and public
comment.ZlO When regulating a non-threshold pollutant, these
outside sources help the Agency make a well-reasoned
decision.21l
Scientific, environmental, public health, and
industry perspectives are all represented in the decisionmaking process. Although some public comment may not focus
on the protection of public health,ZIZ consideration of these
alternative perspectives forces the EPA to support the scientific
basis for its decision.
It is impossible for Congress to anticipate every piece of
scientific evidence, changing health data, technology, and
science, and set a substantive standard for the EPA without
bringing itself to a standstill. In addition, the EPA cannot
pretend that a decision such as the revised PM standard is
based on a determinate scientific principle when the science is
uncertain. A disciplined decision-making process is the only
way to give a scientifically uncertain decision determinacy and
accountability.
2. The CAA Provides the EPA with an "Intelligible Principle."
Section 109 of the CAA provides the EPA with an
"intelligible principle" because it conveys the how, where, when,
and why of NAAQS rule promulgation. Zl3 Consequently, this
uncertainty and the inherent limitations of scientific knowledge by
vesting in the Administrator the discretion to deal with uncertainty
in each case.
Id.; see also Feller, supra note 79, at 836 (suggesting that the EPA may avoid
facing the statistical risk dilemma by focusing on the uncertainty aspect in
their decision-making).
210. See supra Part I.D and accompanying text.
211. See 1997 Final Rule, supra note 2, at 38,667.
212. Inevitably, industry produces scientific evidence for public comment
reflecting its view that the regulations should be less strict. See id. For
example, the EPA relied on public comment in favor of increased industrial
feasibility when it decided to retain the PM10 indicator and add the P~5
indicator, instead of utilizing a P~5-10 indicator. See supra note 104 and
accompanying text. This reliance was found to be "arbitrary and capricious"
by the court. See supra notes 142-47.
213. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(stating that the CAA establishes a "procedural framework"). But see Feller,
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allows the EPA to make well-reasoned decisions despite
scientific uncertainty.214
The statutory language describes the what and when of the
NAAQS promulgation process. The statute mandates that the
EPA must promulgate NAAQS primary standards.215 To guide
promulgation, the statute requires that the EPA identify as
"criteria pollutants" air pollutants that endanger public health
and that come from diverse sources.216 The EPA must then
establish primary NAAQS for each of the criteria pollutants.217
These standards must be promulgated after naming the
criteria pollutant, and revised every five years. 218 Therefore,
the statute's "intelligible principle" determines what air
pollutants the EPA regulates and when it produces regulations
for those contaminants.
The statute's purpose and legislative history define why
the regulations should be promulgated. The CANs purpose is
to protect public heath and welfare against harmful air
pollutants.219 As Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA acknowledged,
this interpretation is strengthened by the legislative history of
Section 109 of the CAA, which suggests that protecting public
health is of such importance that the EPA should only look at
health considerations. 22o The statute's determinate principle
provides the EPA with the only purpose for the standards-the
protection of public health.
Section 109 of the CAA also describes how the NAAQS
decisions should be made. It mandates that regulations be set
at a level "requisite" to protect public health with an adequate
margin of safety.221 The statute tells the EPA where to set the
regulations and how much leeway it should provide for in the
standards. Furthermore, Section 109 dictates the factors upon
supra note 79, at 832 (stating the CAA gives "little guidance as to how air
quality standards are to be selected"). Regrettably, courts have not given
much guidance to the Agency except for ruling out cost and technological
considerations. See id.
214. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 647 F.2d at 1155 ("Congress provided that the
Administrator is to use his judgment in setting air quality standards precisely
to permit him to act in the face of uncertainty.") (footnote omitted).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (1994).
216. Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
217. Supra note 56 and accompanying text.
218. Supra note 63 and accompanying text.
219. Supra note 51 and accompanying text.
220. 647 F.2d at 1148.
221. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994).
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which the EPA must base its decisions. These factors include
public comment,222 a. criteria document,223 and the
recommendations of the CASAC, an independent scientific
committee. 224 The statute also describes several details of
these factors including, for example, who each member of the
CASAC must be and how many members should be on the
committee. 225 The EPA must consider the interests of industry,
the scientific community, environmentalists, the general public,
and the government in its decision. The EPA then must use
health-based criteria to balance these interests. The criteria
focus on the nature and severity of health effects, the types of
health evidence, the kind and degree of uncertainty, and the
size and nature of the population at risk. 226 To summarize,
Section 109 provides the EPA with an "intelligible principle"
because it articulates the how, where, when, and why of the
NAAQS rule promulgation.
3. Courts Have Already Found Section 109 ofthe CAA
Determinate.
Although no court has examined Section 109 for an
"intelligible principle," in Lead Industries Ass'n, the D.C.
Circuit found the statutory language provided "adequate
support" for the Adillinistrator to make a NAAQS regulation
decision. 227 According to Lead Industries Ass'n, the statutory
language defined a basis for the NAAQS's decisions because it
forced the Agency to look at the criteria document, expert
testimony, and public comment to support its factual findings
and policy judgments. 228
In other words, the statute's
222. ld. § 7409(a)(1)(B).
223. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
225. See id.
226. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 647 F.2d at 1161.
227. ld. at 1146. The lead industries argued that the EPA did not
adequately explain how it determined the maximum safe blood level for lead.
ld. at 1157. The court found, however, sufficient support for the EPA's
decision in the criteria document. ld. at 1158. Furthermore, the court stated
that the "Administrator's decision is, of course, precisely the sort of issue that
Congress specifically left to his judgment, and where there is evidence in the
record which supports these judgments, this court is not at liberty to
substitute its judgment for the Administrator's." ld.
228. See id. at 1158. Even if the experts' views differ, the court noted that
"lilt is not our function to resolve disagreement among the experts or to judge
the merits of competing expert views." ld. at 1160 (citing AFL-CIO v.
Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 n.66 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated sub nom. Cotton
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delineation of how the NAAQS should be promulgated has been·
found to be sufficient to support an Agency decision.
Other cases have also upheld challenges to Section 109.229
For example, inNRDC v. EPA, industrial interests argued that
the EPA's procedure for determining the 1987 PM NAAQS was
unrestrained and could "justify virtually any number on the
same basis...."230 The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument and
found that the EPA's decision was reasonable because the data
provided no clear thresholds, so the "Administrator needed to
select a level along a continuum of responses."231 By raising
the nondelegation issue in light of this precedent, American
Trucking erroneously implied that these decisions were
incorrectly decided. These decisions should not be questioned
because they all correctly found that Section 109 provides an
"intelligible principle."
4. Section 109 Is More Determinate than Other Statutory
Language.
Compared with the language of other statutes, the
language of Section 109 sets forth a determinate principle. The
language requiring the protection of public health, at a
"requisite" level, and with "an adequate margin of safety" is far
more definite than the language found in other statutes.
In Yakus v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court
upheld the Emergency Price Control Act, which allowed the
Administrator to set prices that were "generally fair and
equitable."232 Focusing on the text of this delegation, the word
"generally" means "usually,"233 which illustrates that prices
need not always be fair and equitable. On the other hand,
"adequate," as found in Section 109, means the regulation must
be "sufficient to satisfy a requirement."234 This modifier, unlike
the word "generally," does not afford the EPA any discretion.235
Warehouse Ass'n v. Marshall, 449 U.S. 809 (1980».
229. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (upholding the
1987 PM revisions); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (upholding the 1979 ozone revisions).
230. NRDC, 902 F.2d at 969.
231. Id.
232. 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944).
233. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1996), available at http://www.dictionary.comlcgi-binl
dict.pl?term=generally Oast visited Aug. 28, 2000).
234. Id., http://www.dictionary.comlcgi-binldict.pl?term=adequate.
235. But see Lead Indus. Ass'n, 647 F.2d at 1152.
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The Supreme Court has also upheld the FCC's authority
under the Federal Communications Act to regulate "as public
convenierfce, interest, or necessity requires."236 Similarly, the
Court has approved the FCC's authority under the
Communications Act to regulate to "protect the public
interest.''237 Section 109's language is more definite than these
delegations because the statute states the regulation must be
at a level requisite to protect public health. The regulation of
health is more definite than the regulation of public interest
because "public interest" may include any number of factors
relating to social, economic, political, or health concerns.
Agency authority to determine ')ust and reasonable" rates
has also been upheld as sufficiently determinate. 238 Words such
as "reasonable" and "fair" are indefinite because perceptions of
what constitutes fairness and reasonableness differ greatly
across viewpoints. Use of the term "requisite," on the other
hand, requires the Agency to find the level necessary to protect
public health. Because this affords less room for discretion,
Section 109's "requisite" language is more definite. In sum, the
Supreme Court should uphold the statutory language of Section
109 because it is more definite than statutory language upheld
by previous courts.
5. The EPA Followed Section 109's "Intelligible Principle."
In 1997, PM was already a criteria pollutant, so the EPA
only had to follow the procedure for revising the NAAQS.239
Accordingly, the EPA gathered information from public
comment, the criteria document, the staff paper, and the
CASAC to make its decision. 24o
The EPA used this information to produce PM standards
"requisite" for the protection of public health with "an adequate
margin of safety."241 The PMlO level is a necessary standard for
coarse PM because it is the level at which particles penetrate
236. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968)
(citation omitted).
237. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 222 (1943) (upholding FCC
authority under the 1934 Communications Act to regulate broadcast licensing
in the public interest).
238. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600
(1944) (upholding the Federal Power Commission's authority to determine
'just and reasonable" rates).
239. Supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
240. Supra Part LD.
241. See 1997 Final Rule, supra note 2.
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the thoracic region. 242 Although there was no. scientific
evidence available to produce a determinate level for fine PM,
the EPA used all of the information above and made a policy
Ultimately, the EPA's 1997 PM NAAQS
judgment.243
promulgation involved a lengthy and costly process, which
considered presentations by EPA staff, various states,
environmental organizations, and industry.244 The final rule
demonstrates that the EPA followed the statute's "intelligible
principle" because it followed all of the procedures outlined in
the statute. Therefore, the American Trucking court erred by
failing to find that the EPA followed an "intelligible principle"
during the 1997 PM NAAQS revisions.
C. FORCING THE EPA TO ARTICULATE A DETERMINATE
STANDARD WILL WASTE SCARCE RESOURCES MEANT TO
PROTECT THE PuBLIC.
Forcing the EPA to search for a more determinate principle
will result in higher administrative cost while failing to reduce
uncertainty. The rule-making procedure already employs
several costly and time-consuming steps, which fail to produce
concrete answers.245 Even with additional or different steps,
the EPA will still have to make a balancing decision because
non-threshold pollutants have no definite "requisite" level
above zero. 246 The CANs purpose is to promulgate standards
that protect public health. 247 Public health is not adequately
served through the production of more paperwork only to arrive
at a final decision that may not be any more certain than
before.
The court's suggestion to use unit of harm analysis will
also involve more administrative cost, while resulting in the
same uncertainty.248 This approach is not feasible in the realm
of environmental law for several reasons. First, the Oregon
model attempts to allocate scarce resources in an economically
efficient manner; essentially it balances two variables:
242. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
244. See Kass & McCarroll, supra note 27, at 3 (describing the rulemaking
process as "complex and lengthy").
245. See, e.g., supra Part LD.
246. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (discussing the generic
unit of harm criteria).
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economic cost and health. In contrast, the EPA's NAAQS
rulemaking decisions may not be influenced by economic cost.
Moreover, the EPA's resources protect the entire population,
not a select percentage of the population, so there is no need to
allocate funding in the same way. Furthermore, even if the
EPA obtained all the information contained in the Oregon plan,
it would inevitably have to make the same line-drawing
conclusions. 249 Therefore, the court's suggestion to find a
hypothetical formula in order to weigh environmental and
public health is presumptuous and infeasible.
The American Trucking decision is particularly galling
given that the controversy over these standards centers on a
battle between competing interests: economic cost and the
protection of human life.25o This is a battle the industrial
coalition should fight (and has fought and lost) in Congress,
and not in the courts. If not reversed, American Trucking,
ironically, will only waste money and time, inevitably hurting
both sides of the debate. The public, including industry, will
have to pay for the additional procedures suggested by the
court. In addition, this decision endangers the entire structure
of agency rulemaking, including economic rules favored by
industry.
CONCLUSION
Under the CAA, Congress articulated a procedure for the
EPA to follow during the NAAQS revisions. EPA followed this
procedure when it promulgated the 1997 revisions to the PM
standard.
In American Trucking, however, the court
invalidated this procedure and introduced more uncertainty in
this already scientifically uncertain area of law.
The American Trucking court committed several errors.
First, the court erred by looking for an "intelligible principle" in
the EPA's actions. Second, the court did not examine the EPA's
decisions under an arbitrary and capricious standard of review;
rather, it engaged in a searching constitutional review.
Finally, the decision results in severe delegation problems
249. See Kass & McCarroll, supra note 27. This approach would inevitably
leave the EPA in its original position "of having a great deal of information
concerning the perceived and relative public health impacts of various
pollutants but still having to select a NAAQS using its best judgment." [d. at
35.
250. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (describing the
industrial coalition and the coalition's goals).
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because it takes away congressional power and gives it to
agencies. The court's focus on agency action ignores precedent,
by not looking to the eAA for a determinate standard.
Ultimately, the American Trucking decision is flawed
because the EPA did follow an "intelligible principle" and this
principle is articulated in the eAA. Section 109 of the eAA
sets out a disciplined decision-making process that constitutes
an intelligible principle. The language has been upheld by
previous courts and is more definite than· other statutory
language found constitutional by other courts. If this decision
is not reversed, it could severely limit the public's protection
against dangerous air pollutants such as PM. American
Trucking's wrong turn needs to be turned back around.

